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Introduction 
Imagine in a café, you order a cup of coffee and 
soon after, see the barista reaching toward the 
teabags.  You quickly infer that she is about to 
make tea, but did she mis-hear your order, or is 
she serving someone else already? The ability to 
rapidly infer the goal of another person’s action 
and make a guess about her underlying intention 
is critical in everyday social interaction.  
Research on social cognition and the 
problem of understanding other minds has, over 
the last 30 years, been largely dominated by the 
idea of “Theory of mind,” that is, the ability to 
consider the internal, mental states of other 
individuals.  In Premack &Woodruff’s  (1978) 
original paper on Theory of Mind, they 
considered the problem of how to infer another 
actor’s intentions, but research in the 30 years 
since then has been largely dominated by the 
question of how to infer an actor’s beliefs.  This 
is largely because false-belief tasks provide a 
clear-cut (and possibly the only) way to assess a 
participant’s representational theory of mind 
(Dennett, 1978). However, in the last few years, 
interest has grown in the brain and cognitive 
systems, which allow us to infer an actor’s goal 
or intention by watching her actions.  
The present chapter examines the 
problem of understanding goals and intentions in 
other minds, and the integrity of these systems in 
autism.  In the first part, we summarize recent 
research on action understanding in the typical 
brain, distinguishing between brain networks 
associated with mirroring and those associated 
with mentalizing.  In the second part, we 
examine current theories of action understanding 
in autism, in relation to recent behavioural and 
neuroimaging evidence.  Finally, we evaluate the 
data in relation to the theories and consider some 
important future directions.  
Part 1: Two networks in the typical 
brain 
Neuroimaging studies over the last 15 years 
have identified two distinct brain networks 
which are reliably engaged when typical 
individuals engage in non-verbal social 
interactions including observing actions (and 
possibly inferring goals), imitating actions, and 
considering other people’s beliefs and desires.  
These two networks are associated with distinct 
cognitive functions and theoretical approaches.  
We briefly review the major and recent studies 
of each network.   
The mirror neuron system 
Mirror neurons are defined as single cells which 
respond when an individual performs an action 
and observes an equivalent action.  Such neurons 
have been recorded in the premotor and parietal 
cortex of the macaque monkey(Fogassi,Ferrari, 
Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi, & Rizzolatti, 
2005;Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996; di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 1992).  Although individual mirror 
neurons have not been studied in the same 
regions in the human brain, neuroimaging 
evidence suggests that equivalent systems can be 
found (Van Overwalle, 2009; Caspers,Zilles, 
Laird, &Eickhoff, 2010).  The controversy 
(Hickok, 2009)over whether the mirror neuron 
system in monkeys is the same as the system 
identified in humans has largely been resolved 
by two recent fMRI studies.  The first 
demonstrated matching fine-scale patterns of 
activity in parietal cortex during performance 
and observation of finger and hand actions, 
which implies that very similar neuronal 
populations are engaged in each task as 
predicted by the mirror neuron 
hypothesis(Oosterhof, Wiggett, Diedrichsen, 
Tipper, & Downing, 2010).  Secondly, 
Kilner,Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, (2009) 
asked participants to alternately perform and 
observe hand actions during fMRI.  Suppression 
of the BOLD signal in inferior frontal gyrus was 
found when the action performed matched the 
previous observed action and when the action 
observed matched the previous performed 
action.  The best explanation for this pattern of 
activity is that performed and observed actions 
both engage the same population of neurons, as 
required by the mirror neuron hypothesis.  Thus, 
these two studies provide the strongest evidence 
yet for populations of neurons in the human 
brain with the same mirror properties as those 
found in the macaque brain.   Throughout this 
chapter, we use the term “mirror systems” as a 
compact way to describe the human mirror 
neuron system without requiring the presence of 
mirror neurons themselves, and we use the term 
“mirroring” to refer to activity within classic 
mirror system regions which is assumed to link 
representations of performed and observed 
actions.   
Since the discovery of human mirror 
systems, a number of claims have been made 
concerning their function.  The mirror system 
seems to match observed actions onto the 
observer’s own motor system, so it has been 
claimed that this system allows action 
comprehension and imitation “from the 
inside”(Rizzolatti,Giacomo,&Sinigaglia 2010).  
Similar mirror processes have been implicated in 
emotional contagion (Singer,Seymour, 
O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 2004; 
Wicker,Bruno, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, 
Gallese,et al.  , 2003).   Some suggest that these 
processes may provide a fundamental step 
toward language (Rizzolatti,Giacomo,&Arbib 
1998), empathy (Gallese 2003a) and even 
mentalizing (Gallese,Vittorio,& Goldman 1998) 
abilities.  Thus, the mirror system has been 
hailed as a unifying basis for social cognition 
(Gallese, Vittorio,Keysers& Rizzolatti 2004).  
However, the evidence for some of these claims 
remains weak.   
In the present section, we focus on the 
claim that the mirror system provides the brain 
basis for understanding other people’s actions, 
goals and intentions.   Multiple studies have 
reported that the core human mirror system 
regions of inferior parietal lobule (IPL) and 
premotor cortex are engaged when typical 
individuals observe another person acting 
(reviewed in Caspers et al.   2010). But can we 
go further and consider what cognitive processes 
might take place in these regions? When we see 
an action, for example, a child picking an apple, 
we can represent the action in multiple ways.   It 
is possible to encode the shape of the child’s 
hand (a kinematic feature), the object the child 
reaches toward (a goal feature) and the child’s 
overall intention of picking the apple.   The 
human brain likely represents all these features 
simultaneously, but can we distinguish how and 
where these are encoded? 
Recent work suggests that kinematic and 
goal features of observed actions engage slightly 
different components within the human mirror 
system.   Studies examining kinematic 
processing in the human brain indicate 
involvement of both higher order visual systems 
and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG).  For example, if 
you see a person lift a box, you can normally 
infer the weight of the box based on kinematic 
factors such as the velocity of the actor’s lifting 
action (Hamilton,Joyce, Flanagan, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 2007).  However, this ability is 
disrupted if repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation is used to create a “virtual 
lesion”(Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 
2000) of the IFG (Pobric & Hamilton, 2006; 
Hamilton & Grafton,2006).  BOLD responses in 
IFG are also sensitive to different hand apertures 
during grasping actions (Hamilton,& Grafton, 
2008) and to different grasp types for example, 
ring pull vs. precision grip (Kilner et al.  , 2009).   
Evidence from single cell recordings in macaque 
monkeys also provides support for the idea that 
kinematic analysis occurs in area F5 (the 
monkey homologue of human IFG) as different 
types of grasp elicit different neuronal firing 
rates (Bonini, Serventi, Simone, Rozzi, Ferrari, 
& Fogassi, 2011; Spinks, Kraskov, Brochier, 
Umilta, & Lemon, 2008).   
In contrast, studies of goal processing 
suggest that the parietal mirror system, in 
particular anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS), is 
sensitive to action goals, independent of the 
kinematics that were used to achieve that goal.  
Hamilton &Grafton (2006) used a repetition 
suppression task in which participants watched 
movies of a hand reaching for a food item or tool 
during fMRI scanning.  Data analysis compared 
trials where the goal of the action was the same 
as the previous trial (e.  g.   take-cookie followed 
by take-cookie)compared with trials where the 
goal of the action was different to the previous 
trial (e.  g.   take-disk followed by take-cookie).  
The results show that BOLD signal in just one 
cortical region, the left aIPS, was suppressed 
when participants saw a repeated action-goal 
regardless of the hand trajectory used.  This 
pattern of response is predicted only in brain 
regions which contain neuronal populations that 
are sensitive to the manipulated features of the 
movies (taking a cookie vs.  a disk)(Grill-
Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006).  This means 
that aIPS contains neuronal populations which 
are sensitive to action goals.  Oosterhof et al. 
(2010)also found evidence for the encoding of 
action goals in aIPS using a multi-voxel pattern 
analysis method that compared fine-grained 
activation of voxels across conditions.  Further 
studies found that the IPL also encodes action 
outcomes, regardless of the action kinematics 
(Hamilton & Grafton, 2009).   In this study the 
same object was acted upon, only the means by 
which the goal was achieved was manipulated.   
Action outcome resulted in differential BOLD 
responses in the IPL regardless of the action 
kinematics.  Data from monkeys is also 
compatible with this position, with reports of 
single neurons which differentiate reach-to-eat 
and reach-to-place actions in the IPL (Fogassi et 
al. , 2005).  Note that goal here is defined very 
simply in terms of the identity of the object a 
person grasps, for example, taking a cookie 
compared with taking a computer disk.  More 
complex action sequences and their goals might 
be represented elsewhere.  
Together, these studies demonstrate that 
the human mirror system responds selectively to 
observed actions, and that different types of 
action processes depend more on different 
components of the mirror system.  In particular, 
kinematic features of an action are encoded in 
the frontal mirror system, while goal features are 
encoded in the parietal mirror system.  However, 
these mirror systems are not necessarily the only 
brain regions with a role in action understanding.  
As detailed in the next section, some action 
comprehension tasks also engage brain areas 
associated with mentalizing.   
The mentalizing system 
Mentalizing is the process of attributing mental 
states (beliefs, desires, and intentions) to another 
actor.  Multiple studies have identified a 
mentalizing network in the brain, comprising 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ).  Temporal poles 
and precuneus are also sometimes found (see 
Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Amodio& Frith, 2006; 
Saxe &Kanwisher, 2003, for reviews).  These 
regions are engaged when reading stories which 
require mental state attributions (Saxe & Powell, 
2006; Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010) or 
when considering the beliefs and future actions 
of others in interactive games (Fletcher et al.  , 
1995).  For example, playing rock-paper-scissors 
encourages participants to think (“he thinks I’ll 
do rock, but I’ll do scissors and trick him”), and 
computational models can track this type of 
belief inference occurring in mPFC and TPJ 
(Hampton & Bossaerts, 2008; Yoshida, 
Seymour, Friston, & Dolan, 2010).   However, 
the mentalizing network is not only engaged in 
tasks requiring explicit verbal belief inference.   
We focus here on the increasing number of 
studies that report engagement of this network 
during non-verbal or minimally verbal tasks in 
which participants attribute intentions or 
consider the longer term motivations underlying 
an action.   
One of the earliest non-verbal 
mentalizing studies recorded brain activity while 
participants viewed animated triangles moving 
on the screen (Castelli, Happé, Frith, & Frith, 
2000).  For some of these animations, typical 
individuals spontaneously describe the action in 
terms of the mental states of the triangles (e.g. 
“the big triangle is coaxing the little triangle”), 
while for others the action of the triangles is 
purposeless.   Observation of the mentalizing 
triangles results in activation of mPFC and TPJ, 
despite the lack of verbal stimuli or instructions.   
More recently, spontaneous activation of 
mentalizing systems during action observation 
was reported by Brass,Schmitt, Spengler, & 
Gergely, (2007).   In this study Brass and 
colleagues showed participants movies of 
unusual actions (e. g.  turning on a light with 
your knee). In some cases, the context made the 
action rational (e. g.  turning on a light with your 
knee because your hands are fully occupied), but 
in other movies the same action was judged as 
irrational (turning on the light with your knee 
when your hands are free).  Brass et al. report 
greater activation in the mentalizing network 
including TPJ and mPFC when participants 
viewed irrational actions compared with rational 
ones.  Critically, this activation was not related 
to the unfamiliarity of the actions because all 
actions were unusual.  Rather, the engagement 
of TPJ and mPFC reflected the judged 
rationality of the actions.  This study shows that 
observation of human actions without 
instructions to mentalize can engage brain 
regions associated with mentalizing if the 
observed actions are hard to interpret.  
Further studies have refined our 
knowledge of when action understanding 
engagesmentalizing brain systems. de 
Lange,Spronk, Willems, Toni, & 
Bekkering,(2008) showed participants images of 
ordinary actions, actions which had an unusual 
intention and actions which had unusual 
kinematic features.  This study found that while 
participants watched actions with an unusual 
intention, there was greater activity in the STS 
and mPFC, whereas actions with unusual 
kinematic features activated the IFG more.  This 
study suggests that both mirror and mentalizing 
systems are complimentary systems which both 
contribute to action understanding. The 
additional recruitment of the mentalizing system 
for action understanding in social contexts is 
also reported in a study by Ramsey & Hamilton 
(2010).  In this study, participants watched short 
movies of a toy animal hiding in one of two 
locations.  Following the hiding phase, an actor 
came out from behind a curtain, surveyed the 
possible locations and reached into one to find 
the toy.  Similar to the previously mentioned 
studies, the results showed complimentary 
activation of both mirror and mentalizing 
systems; the IFG was sensitive to action 
trajectory while the mPFC and right temporal 
pole were sensitive to successful search 
behaviour. The design of these studies does not 
allow strong conclusions about whether 
participants were attributing beliefs to the actor 
or only 
considering intentions, but both studies show 
that tasks focused on intentions with no explicit 
belief component are processed differently from 
tasks that focus on simple goals.  
Differential engagement of mentalizing 
and mirroring systems in the brain can also be 
driven by task demands. In an fMRI study by 
Spunt,Satpute, & Lieberman(2011), participants 
showed increased BOLD responses inIPL and 
IFG regions during action observation when 
participants were asked to think about how the 
actions were being performed.  In the same 
subjects and with the same action stimuli, mPFC 
and TPJ were more active when participants 
were asked to think aboutwhy the actions were 
being performed.  This study shows a nice 
dissociation between levels of action processing 
in the brain.  It seems that the mirror systems are 
recruited for kinematic analysis of actions, such 
as “they are gripping a tin can”, but the 
mentalizing system is recruited for long-term 
 
Figure 21.1  Brain and cognitive systems for action comprehension.  
Left:Brain systems involved in mirroring (IFG: inferior frontal gyrus;IPL: inferior parietal lobule, aIPS: anterior 
intraparietal sulcus), mentalizingmPFC: medial prefrontal cortex;TPJ: temporoparietal junction), and visual 
processing of human actions (MTG: middle temporal gyrus; STS: superior temporal sulcus). Right:A sketch of a 
cognitive model of action processing.  Under a mirroring first model (black arrows) visual information 
processed (MTG/STS) is first matched onto the observers own motor system (IFG), before the goal of the action 
is extracted (aIPS/IPL) and then longer-term intentions can be defined (TPJ/mPFC). Under a visual inference 
model (dashed grey arrows), the visual processing (MTG/STS)is sufficient to allow immediate extraction of 
goals (aIPS/IPL) and longer term intentions (TPJ/mPFC) without the requirement for motor activation.  
 
intentionality judgments, such as “they are 
recycling the can to save the environment. 
”Again, this study does not distinguish long-
term intentions (“I want to recycle”) from beliefs 
that underlie the intention(“It is good to 
recycle”).  
Summary 
All of these studies suggest that the MNS is not 
the only brain system engaged in action 
comprehension, but that more complex tasks and 
situations may call on the mentalizing network. 
At least two ways in which mirroring and 
mentalizing systems might be related can be 
described (Hamilton, 2008). Under a “mirroring 
first” model (Figure21. 1, black arrows), full 
engagement of frontal and parietal mirror 
regions is a necessary precondition for 
mentalizing about an observed action. In 
contrast, in a visual inference model (Csibra& 
Gergely, 2007), visual information alone is 
sufficient to determine the goal of an action and 
engage in mentalizing, and frontal mirror 
systems are not required. Understanding how the 
mirroring and mentalizing networks are related 
is an important area for future research. It is also 
a critical question in making sense of action 
understanding in autism. We consider the 
evidence for the integrity and relationship of 
mirroring and mentalizing processes in autism in 
the next section.  
 
 
Part 2: Mirroring and mentalizing in 
autism 
Typically, we automatically attribute goals and 
intentions to the agents that we observe.  
However, individuals with autism may not make 
these same attributions.  Currently, there are two 
competing theories that claim that people with 
autism have difficulty understanding goals and 
intentions of others.  These are the “mentalizing 
theory” and the “broken mirror theory. ” Each of 
these theories proposes that one of the two 
reviewed action understanding networks 
function atypically in autism.  In the mentalizing 
theory, it is proposed that only mentalizing 
network is abnormal, while at least basic 
processing in the mirror system is normal. In 
contrast, the broken mirror theory proposes that 
a core deficit in mirroring leads to difficulties 
with mentalizing. In the next section, we 
examine each of these theories, then consider the 
evidence from each, looking at traditional 
behavioural tasks, implicit measures, such as 
eyetracking and EMG, and neuroimaging 
measures.  
Mentalizing theory 
There is little disputing the repeated finding that 
many children and adults with autism have 
particular difficulties with false belief tasks 
(Baron-Cohen,Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Frith, 
2001). Brain activity in mentalizing regions 
when participants with autism watch the 
animated triangles movies is also abnormal 
(Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002). The 
mentalizing theory proposes that these 
difficulties are symptoms of an inability to 
represent otherpeople’s mental states (Frith, 
Morton, & Leslie, 1991), or to decouple mental 
states from reality (Leslie, 1987). Within this 
field, there is an important distinction between 
implicit and explicit 
mentalizing(Apperly&Butterfill, 2009).  
Explicit theory of mind is measured with 
traditional false-belief tasks such as Maxi’s 
chocolate in which one actor has a false-belief 
about the location of an object. Participants are 
typically asked to say or point to the place where 
Maxi will look for his chocolate 
(Wimmer&Perner, 1983). Typical children 
under around 4. 5 years old often fail this task, 
and autistic individuals with a verbal mental age 
below 9. 2 years also tend to fail (Happé, 1995). 
However, more able individuals with autism 
often pass false-belief tasks, and may even pass 
more complex second order tasks (Happé, 1994). 
Thus, there is a dissociation between the time 
course of explicit false belief development in 
typical children (emerging at around 4. 5 years 
and complete by 8 years) and the timencourse of 
autism (emerging between 1 and 2 years of age 
and lasting throughout the lifespan). This has led 
to a search for precursors to mentalizing and to 
the investigation of other theories of autism.  
In contrast to the late development of 
explicit mentalizing, implicit mentalizing seems 
to be present from early infancy (Kovacs, 
Teglas, &Endress, 2010; Onishi&Baillargeon, 
2005) and is measured by recording gaze 
durations and eye movements when participants 
view movies in which an actor has a false belief. 
Recent data demonstrate that even high 
functioning adults with Asperger’s syndrome 
who pass verbal false belief tasks fail to show 
implicit mentalizing in an eye tracking task 
(Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). It is 
now argued that failure of implicit mentalizing is 
the core difficulty in autism (Frith, 2012). This 
resolves the difficulties over the time course of 
mentalizing failure, because implicit mentalizing 
develops over the first two years of life at the 
same time that autism emerges, and implicit 
mentalizing remains impaired in high-
functioning adults with autism. Brain imaging 
data on implicit mentalizing in autism is not yet 
available, but it is possible that current tasks 
such as describing the behaviour of animated 
triangles tap into implicit mentalizing resources. 
Brain activation in this task is abnormal in high 
functioning adults with autism, despite their 
good explicit theory of mind skills (Castelli et al. 
2002).  
Research on implicit mentalizing and 
the precise difference between implicit and 
explicit tasks is ongoing, and further 
developments in understanding the role of 
implicit theory of mind in autism are likely.  For 
present purposes, we contrast a pure mentalizing 
theory of autism with a broken mirror theory.  
The pure mentalizing theory predicts that 
mentalizing is a single, core deficit in autism and 
that other social brain systems are unaffected or 
secondarily affected.  For example, basic goal 
understanding processes should be intact in 
autism under the mentalizing theory because 
these do not require the mentalizing network.  
However, there is still debate over whether 
difficulties with mentalizing are a single, core 
deficit in autism or whether these are a 
consequence of abnormal processing in other 
social brain systems, for example the mirror 
system.  We consider this question in the next 
section.  
Broken mirror theory 
The broken mirror theory claims that 
developmental failure of the mirror system is the 
primary social difficulty in autism, and a cause 
of poor mentalizing.  Under this theory, deficits 
in understanding the kinematic and goal features 
of an action would lead to further difficulties in 
understanding emotions and mental states.  
Initial evidence in support of this theory came 
primarily from studies of imitation.  When 
typical adults imitate hand actions, the mirror 
system is activated (Buccino, Binkofski, 
&Riggio, 2004; Decety, Chaminade, Grèzes, & 
Meltzoff, 2002; Iacoboni, 1999) and damage to 
the mirror system in adults causes imitation 
difficulties (Heilman, Rothi, &Valenstein, 
1982).  Children with autism may also have 
trouble with imitation tasks, as summarized in a 
meta-analysis (Williams, Whiten, & Singh, 
2004).  Some studies report abnormal brain 
responses in autistic children during imitation 
(Dapretto et al. , 2006) and action observation 
(Nishitani, Avikainen, &Hari, 2004; Oberman, 
Hubbard, McCleery, Altschuler, Ramachandran, 
& Pineda, 2005).  Based on these findings, it 
was suggested that dysfunction of the mirror 
system in children with autism might cause first 
a lack of imitation, and later difficulties in 
understanding other people’s intentions or 
emotions in social situations (Iacoboni & 
Dapretto, 2006; Ramachandran&Oberman, 
2006; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf, & Perrett, 
2001).  
A more recent variant of the broken 
mirror theory focuses not on comprehension of 
individual goal directed actions, but on the 
prediction of actions in a sequence.  The account 
is based on the finding that mirror neurons in 
parietal cortex encode actions as part of a 
sequence (Fogassi et al. , 2005). For example, 
some mirror neurons in inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) respond selectively when the monkey 
brings food to his mouth or sees someone bring 
food to their mouth, but not when bringing a 
small object toward the shoulder or seeing 
someone bring an object to their shoulder.  They 
suggest these mirror neurons allow an observer 
to chain actions together and represent 
intentions. Building on this work, 
Cattaneo,Fabbri-Destro, Boria, Pieraccini, 
Monti, Cossu, et al. , (2007) measured 
electromyographic(EMG) recordings from a 
jaw-opening muscle (mylohyoid MH) in 
children when they were performing simple 
reach-to-eat and reach-to-place actions.  In 
typical children, MH activity increased during 
the reach phase of a reach-to-eat action, but not 
of a reach-to-place action, and similar results 
were found for observation of actions.  Thus, 
typical children chain together the reach and 
mouth-open actions of an eating sequence, and 
show similar predictive mouth opening when 
observing others.  In contrast, matched children 
with autism did not show this anticipatory mouth 
opening, during either performance or 
observation.  Based on these data, Rizzolatti 
&Fabbri-Destro(2010) put forward an action-
chaining hypothesis of autism. They suggest that 
predicting actions and inferring intentions in this 
way is a precursor to mentalizing and belief 
inference skills. If this is true, then a deficit in 
action chaining could lead to the social deficits 
we see in autism(Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro, 
&Cattaneo, 2009).  
Contrasting the mentalizing and broken 
mirror theories, some important differences 
emerge.  The traditional mentalizing theory 
derives from a symbolic, abstract view of 
cognition (Leslie, 1987), while the broken mirror 
account is associated with an embodied 
approach which emphasizes the role of 
simulation in understanding others (Gallese, 
2003b; Goldman, 2006).  Similarly, the 
mentalizing theory places the primary deficit in 
“high level” reasoning about and representation 
of mental states, and assumes that abnormal 
social behaviour in simple situations are a 
consequence of this.  Meanwhile, the broken 
mirror theory focuses on lower level problems 
with imitation and assumes that failure on theory 
of mind tasks arises because simpler simulation 
mechanisms are dysfunctional in autism.  
Neither theory attempts to account for all the 
characteristics of autism, including non-social 
problems such as repetitive behaviours or 
differences in perceptual processing that might 
be attributed to weak central coherence (Frith 
&Happé, 1994).  
To test and discriminate between the 
mentalizing theory and the broken mirror theory, 
it is interesting to examine the realms where they 
overlap.  In particular, goals and intentions are 
relevant to both theories.  Mirror neurons in 
macaque monkeys respond only to goal-directed 
actions (Fogassi et al. , 2005; Gallese, et al. , 
1996; Umiltà,Kohler, Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, 
Keysers,et al. , 2001), so goals are key to the 
original idea of mirror neuron function.  The 
human mirror system seems to be more general, 
with some response even to actions without a 
goal, but goal-directed actions are a powerful 
stimulus which robustly activate this system 
(Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, &Keysers, 2007; 
Iacoboni,Molnar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, 
Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 2005; 
Koski,Wohlschläger, Bekkering, Woods, 
Dubeau, Mazziotta,et al. , 2002).  Damage to the 
human parietal mirror system, e. g.  from stroke, 
is known to cause difficulties with understanding 
and performing meaningful or goal-directed 
actions (Buxbaum, Kyle, &Menon, 2005).  
Therefore, a lack of goal understanding in 
autism is a key prediction of the broken mirror 
theory.  
In this section, we evaluate the claims 
that either the whole mirror system or the ability 
to chain actions in a sequence is abnormal in 
autism.  We focus mainly on recent studies that 
use implicit (eyetracking or EMG) measures of 
action comprehension and on neuroimaging 
studies.  A large number of studies of imitation 
in autism have been reviewed in greater depth 
elsewhere (Hamilton, 2008; 
Southgate&Hamilton, 2008; Williams et al. , 
2001).  
Behavioural studies of action 
understanding in autism 
Multiple studies have reported poorer imitation 
performance in children with autism compared 
with typical children on general batteries of 
imitation tasks, including imitation of 
meaningless actions, mimicry of facial 
expressions and the spatial perspective taking 
component of imitation.  These results have led 
to the claim that there is a global imitation 
impairment in autism (Williams et al. , 2004). 
However, more recent studies suggest autistic 
children successfully imitate when explicitly 
instructed to do so, whether imitating hand 
actions (Beadle-Brown, 2004) or facial 
expressions (McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, 
Winkielman, &Wilbarger, 2006).  They also 
show better performance in a highly structured 
imitation task than in a task requiring 
spontaneous imitation (Hepburn & Stone, 2006).  
An interesting comparison in imitation 
studies is between imitation of a goal and 
imitation of kinematic features or action style, 
because these fall at different levels of the action 
hierarchy.  Hobson and colleagues (Hobson & 
Hobson, 2008; Hobson & Lee, 1999) tested 
children with autism on a novel action imitation 
task.  For example, children were shown how to 
scrape two objects together to make a sound and 
were asked to copy.  Children with autism were 
able to perform the same, goal directed action, 
but failed to mimic the style (loud or soft) with 
which the action was performed.  Intact goal-
directed imitation in children with autism has 
also been seen in a simple hand movement task.  
Autistic children and controls matched for verbal 
mental age were tested on Bekkering’s goal 
directed imitation task (Bekkering, 
Wohlschlaeger, &Gattis, 2000).  In this task 
children were asked to copy an experimenter 
who touched one of two targets on the table in 
front of them.  The experimenter sometimes 
made an ipsilateral movement of her hand to the 
nearest dot (e. g.  left hand to left dot) and 
sometimes made a contralateral movement of 
her hand to the further dot (e. g.  right hand to 
left dot). Both groups of children accurately 
imitated the action goal, i. e.  they touched the 
appropriate dot on the table.  More importantly, 
both typical and autistic children made 
systematic hand errors; when the demonstrator 
moved her hand across her body, the child 
correctly imitated the goal, but failed to use the 
appropriate hand (Hamilton,Brindley, & Frith, 
2007).  This is the pattern of behaviour taken by 
Bekkering and colleagues to be a signature of 
goal directed imitation.  Children with autism 
are not imitating only the outcome of the action, 
but must be identifying the goal and selecting 
how to achieve that goal.  Thus, the data 
provides evidence that both typical and autistic 
children have a goal hierarchy and can 
understand and imitate the goal of an adult’s 
action.  Furthermore, children with autism can 
and go beyond the immediately visible goal of 
an adult’s action and imitate goals which they 
had not seen achieved.  Two independent studies 
(Aldridge, Stone, Sweeney, & Bower, 2000; 
Carpenter, Pennington, & Rogers, 2001) found 
that children with autism completed the action of 
pulling apart the dumb-bell even when the adult 
demonstrator had never successfully performed 
the action.  In summary, it seems that autistic 
children are able to imitate actions, when given 
clear and explicit instructions to do so.  The 
behavioural evidence reviewed here suggests 
that simple goal representation is intact in 
autism, contrary to the predictions of the broken 
mirror hypothesis.  
Understanding of more complex goals 
or action sequences is being increasingly studied 
in autism, but results are contradictory.  One 
study using a picture ordering task to compare 
understanding of mental state sequences to 
simpler goal-directed action sequences found 
that individuals with autism had no problems 
understanding and ordering the goal directed 
sequences (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986).  
However, a similar study found participants with 
autism did have trouble understanding object-
directed action sequences (Zalla, Labruyere, 
&Georgieff, 2006), but surprisingly not 
interactive action sequences.  
More recently, a study by Boria,Fabbri-
Destro, Cattaneo, Sparaci, Sinigaglia, Santelli,et 
al.  (2009) demonstrated poorer understanding of 
subsequent actions in children with autism.  In 
this study, children were shown static images of 
a hand either touching an object, grasping-to-use 
it or grasping-to-place it.  Children were asked 
what the actor was doing and why.  Children 
with autism were able to distinguish touching 
and grasping actions.  They were also able to 
identify subsequent use of the object, as well as 
typically developing children in the grasp-to-use 
condition.  However, their performance was 
substantially poorer when identifying the grasp-
to-place actions, with object-use dominating 
their responses, despite the grasp type rendering 
this action implausible.  Boria and colleagues 
argue that children with autism are unable to use 
the motor information to make an inference 
about the subsequent action, providing evidence 
for the action chaining theory.  However, in their 
second similar experiment, children with autism 
were able to identify grasp-to-place actions if an 
image of the end goal was also present.  Boria 
argues that this evidence corroborates their 
initial finding and children with autism are not 
just making stereotyped, object-use responses.  
An alternative explanation for this improved 
ability in the second experiment could be that 
the imagination demands are reduced as the 
action end point is visible.  A better test of this 
effect should test different, dynamic grasps with 
the possible end points visible.  This will reduce 
the imagination demand of the task and will 
require correct analysis of the motor properties 
of the grasp to infer the subsequent action.  
Implicit measures of action 
understanding in autism 
Eye tracking studies of action observation have 
also been used to assess mirror neuron function 
in autistic children.  Typically, eye movements 
during action observation and action execution 
are predictive of the actions that they are 
monitoring.  It has been suggested that these 
predictive eye movements are reflective of 
mirror neuron function as eye movements during 
action observation mirror those during action 
execution (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003).  In 
support of this claim, (Cannon & Woodward, 
2008) demonstrated that predictive eye 
movements during action observation are 
disrupted by simultaneous performance of 
sequential finger movements, but not by the 
rehearsal of sequences of numbers.  In a study of 
autistic 5-year olds, (Falck-Ytter, 2010) 
demonstrated that infants with autism were able 
to anticipate actions to the same degree as 
typical infants and adults.  This finding suggests 
that even young children with autism are able to 
predict the actions of others and provides 
evidence against impaired action chaining in 
autism.  
However, other studies of action chaining in 
autism do suggest difficulties. Cattaneo et al 
(2007), as described earlier, showed that 
children with autism failed to produce predictive 
MH muscle activation during the performance or 
observation of a reach-to-eat action, in contrast 
to typical control children.  They argue that this 
indicates a failure of action chaining in 
participants with autism.  One limitation in this 
study is the failure to exclude dyspraxia in the 
autistic sample of participants; dyspraxia is often 
comorbid with autism (Ming, Brimacombe, & 
Wagner, 2007) and impacts on motor control, 
but it is not linked to mentalizing.  
Further evidence for impaired action 
chaining in autism comes from a study by 
Fabbri-Destro,Cattaneo, Boria, & 
Rizzolatti(2009) who used a similar 
methodology to that of Johnson-Frey,McCarty, 
& Keen,(2004).  In this study, children with and 
without autism were asked to pick up a block 
and move it to either a small or large container 
whilst their movement time was measured.  
Throughout the experiment, the task demands of 
the reach action remained constant.  However, 
manipulating the size of the container increased 
the task demands of the place action.  Despite 
the controlled demands of the reach action 
across conditions, typically developing children 
modified the speed of the initial reach action 
such that they were slower when the following 
action was harder and faster when the following 
 
Figure 21. 2:  Responses of mirroring and mentalizing brain systems in autism 
(A)Still frames of the five movies types used in Marsh & Hamilton (2011).  In each movie the hand started on 
the right, moved across to pick up an object and returned its original position. R1: rational action, R2: rational 
action with a barrier, I1: irrational action, I2: irrational action with a barrier, S: control movie showing three 
shapes, one of which moved linearly across the screen.  (B)Activity in left aIPS was greater during the 
observation of hand actions compared with moving shapes in both autism and typical participants. (C)Activity in 
mPFC was sensitive to action rationality in the typical group, but not in the autism group.  
 
action was easier.  This bias is thought to reflect 
future planning of the second action in the 
sequence.  In children with autism, the speed of 
the reach action was not biased by the difficulty 
of the following action, indicating a lack of 
action planning.  Overall, the evidence for 
impaired action chaining in autism is mixed.  
Eye-tracking studies show that online action 
prediction is functioning typically in autistic 
children.  Studies that use more complex action 
sequences do reveal differences between typical 
and autistic children, although they fail to 
control for motor ability in their tasks.  Further 
research is needed to assess the action chaining 
account of the broken mirror hypothesis.  
Neuroimaging studies of action 
understanding in autism 
Neuroimaging techniques provide the most 
rigorous tests of the integrity of the mirror 
system in autism.  A number of early studies 
report differences between typical and autistic 
participants.  For example, Oberman et al. 
(2005) report reduced mu wave suppression 
during observation and execution of hand 
actions in typical participants, but mu 
suppression only occurred during execution 
tasks in the autistic participants.  In addition, 
Théoret,Halligan, Kobayashi, Fregni, Tager-
Flusberg, & Pascual-Leone(2005) demonstrated 
that motor evoked potentials, induced by 
transcranial magnetic stimulation during action 
observation were reduced for autistic 
participants.  However, no group differences in 
magneto-encephalographic recordings were 
found between typical and autistic participants 
during the observation of hand actions 
(Avikainen, Kulomäki, & Hari, 1999).  It is 
important to note that all of these studies used 
measures with very limited localization of 
effects and participant numbers were low.  
fMRI studies provide evidence with 
better spatial resolution and can identify specific 
brain abnormalities in a more convincing way.  
Dapretto,Davies, Pfeifer, Scott, Sigman, 
Bookheimer,et al.  (2006) conducted the first 
study to provide evidence for the broken mirror 
hypothesis with fMRI.  In their study, 
participants were asked to observe and imitate 
emotional facial expressions during fMRI 
scanning.  They report reduced activation in the 
IFG component of the mirror system during 
observation and imitation in autistic participants.  
Furthermore, the amount of activation 
significantly correlated with autistic symptom 
severity.  However, imitation of emotional facial 
expressions is not a goal-directed action task and 
it is very different from the original hand-
grasping studies that were used to study the 
mirror neuron system in monkeys (Gallese et al, 
1996).  Therefore, this study provides only weak 
evidence for the broken mirror hypothesis.  
In a more comparable study of hand 
actions, Dinstein,Thomas, Humphreys, 
Minshew, Behrmann, &Heeger,(2010)asked 
participants to perform and observe sequences of 
simple hand postures during fMRI scanning.  
They report no group differences between 
autistic and typical participants during 
observation or execution of hand postures in 
mirror neuron regions.  In addition, autistic 
participants demonstrated normal movement 
selectivity for repeated hand postures in left 
anterior intraparietal sulcus (aIPS) and ventral 
premotor cortex (vPM) in both observation and 
execution conditions.  This study provides the 
first robust evidence against mirror system 
dysfunction in autism.  
Only one study has tried to assess the 
integrity of both mirror and mentalizing systems 
in autism in the same study (Marsh & Hamilton, 
2011). Manipulation of action rationality was 
used as a tool to engage the mentalizing system.  
As previously reported, Brass et al.  (2007) 
demonstrated that irrational actions 
automatically activate the mentalizing system in 
the typical observer, even with no prior 
instruction to mentalize.  By using matched 
rational and irrational action stimuli Marsh and 
Hamilton (2011) were able to dissociate 
mirroring and mentalizing systems in the autistic 
brain in a non-verbal, action observation task.  
Eighteen adults with autism and 19 age 
and IQ-matched typical adults completed the 
experiment.  They watched movies of simple, 
goal-directed reach actions to either a piece of 
food or a tool during fMRI scanning.  Some 
actions were rational (Figure21. 2, R1&R2) 
while in others the hand took an irrational route 
to reach the target object (Figure21. 2, I1 & I2). 
Control movies depicting a shape drifting across 
the screen were also shown.  The results showed 
that both typical and autistic participants engage 
mirror regions, in particular left aIPS when 
observing hand actions.  In addition, this area 
was also sensitive to action goals in both 
participant groups.  As the left aIPS is the 
established goal processing region of the mirror 
system as defined in Hamilton &Grafton (2006, 
2008), this result provides evidence against a 
global mirror neuron deficit in autism and 
corroborates behavioural evidence that suggests 
that goal understanding is intact in autism.  
Figure 2 
 
In contrast, differences between the 
typical and autistic participants emerged when 
regions outside the mirror system were 
examined, and when action rationality was 
considered.  In both typical and autistic 
participants, the right aIPS was activated for 
irrational actions compared with rational actions.  
However, in the mPFC, only typical participants 
differentiate irrational from rational actions.  
mPFC activity in the autistic participants 
remained the same regardless of the rationality 
of the observed action.  These results 
demonstrate that, within the same group of 
participants, responses in the mirror system to 
observed actions can be normal while responses 
in the mentalizing system are abnormal.  
Summary 
Evidence for the integrity of mirroring and 
mentalizing brain systems in autism has been 
reviewed above. In typical individuals, the 
mirror system encodes action kinematics and 
goals, while the mentalizing system plays a role 
in making inferences about the actors’ beliefs 
and intentions.  Evidence for poor mentalizing in 
autism is clear cut, but there is much less support 
for the proposal that this social difficulty 
originates in failure of mirror systems.  Many 
studies have demonstrated good goal 
understanding in autism, together with normal 
brain responses in mirror systems.  However, 
people with autism may have difficulty 
understanding sequences of actions, or chaining 
actions together and this area warrants further 
exploration.  
Conclusions 
From the studies reviewed in this chapter, no 
clear cut evidence emerges for a fundamental 
mirror system deficit in autism.  Behavioural 
studies have shown that people with autism have 
a good understanding of action goals.  
Furthermore, two independent neuroimaging 
studies have reported that the parietal component 
of the mirror system is functioning typically in 
individuals with autism.  Some evidence for the 
action chaining account exists, but stringent 
neuroimaging studies need to test this further.  
Few studies have directly tested the integrity of 
mentalizing systems in relation to action 
understanding in autism, but initial reports 
suggest that this may be functioning atypically.  
An important future direction in this 
field is to establish the relationship between the 
mirror system and the mentalizing system.  How 
does kinematic and goal information about 
actions translate into an understanding of 
intention? Action rationality is a new tool that 
can tap in to both mirror and mentalizing 
systems and studies comparing rational and 
irrational actions may be able to provide us with 
a better understanding of the interactions 
between mirroring and mentalizing.  However, a 
better understanding of what action rationality is 
and why irrational actions engage the 
mentalizing system is also needed.  Implicit 
measures, such as eye-tracking, give us insight 
into the fast, automatic processing of actions and 
can allude to subtle differences in perception in 
autism.  
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